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Executive Summary
“Those who cannot learn from history are condemned to repeat it”
(Weir, 1999, P.248)
It is commonplace to hear delegates at a conference, students, the media and 
many others wonder why lessons are not learned from disasters. 
They may also attempt to extrapolate broad learning points such as the need for 
“better communications” or “planning”. 
There is a wealth of research available which examines both the key themes of 
public inquiries and also the way in which the lessons of inquiries can be learned by 
other organisations. Crucially much of this research also identifies key barriers to 
learning.
This is a vital element of practicing effective emergency management. The 
overriding aim of this research is to provide material that is of use to today’s 
emergency planners in their everyday work. 
This review was completed using an iterative approach that examined a wide range 
of literature. It provides a summary of the systematic weakness and failures that 
have been identified by public inquiries into disasters since 1985, and also draws 
on commentary from a range of sources to identify barriers that have prevented 
organisations from “actively learning” from these recommendations. Suggested 
techniques for ensuring that organisations learn lessons from their own near misses 
and historical examples of disasters have also been reviewed.
Public inquiries have been identified as “the most valuable source of information to 
help prevent recurrence of disasters” (Toft and Reynolds, 1999, P.45) but 
Emergency Planners must also recognise that the capture and publication of the 
knowledge acquired in a public inquiry is only one step in the learning process.
It is important to look beyond the one organisation/s featured in the inquiry report 
e.g. although the disaster may refer to a rail crash many of the lessons could be 
applicable to any organisation.
By analysing the themes that have been identified in this review, emergency 
planners will be able to see the way in which “lessons learned” have been 
incorporated into current civil protection arrangements and shaped the design of the 
Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
This review highlights key themes within inquiry reports that have resonance for a 
all organisations. By considering the implications of these themes and crucially 
remaining alert to the potential barriers for learning from them those working in the 
field of civil protection have the opportunity to examine ways in which they can 
enhance resilience. 
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Notes on Methodology
The Limitations of this Review
There are a range of inquiry reports that have some relevance to this type of 
discussion, however in the interests of brevity the main focus has been limited to 
“Judicial Public Inquiries after disasters since 1985” (as defined by the Emergency 
Planning College Terms of Reference). 
Health and Safety inquiries have been omitted except where they have direct links 
to the other elements of the disaster inquiry. As discussed below Rail, Air and 
Shipping disasters have their own systems of mandatory inquiry. Emergency 
Planners may also want to direct their attention towards these (a large number are 
held in the EPC library) as their findings and lessons learned can be extremely 
valuable.
In recent years inquiries have investigated public health issues, medical negligence, 
child protection issues, financial matters and the death of a government scientist; 
Emergency Planners should not restrict their own studies to disaster inquiries but 
will also find many learning points within inquiries examining agency responses, 
such as those inquiring into the deaths of Stephen Lawrence, Victoria Climbie and 
the patients of Harold Shipman.
Reference is also made to a number of recent disasters where inquiries have not 
been held, or have not been held using a Judicial Public Inquiry and these are 
included in the appendix. 
Guidance for using this Review
This guidance is designed to provide links and introductions to the many sources of 
information available on public inquiries. Due to the brevity of this review it can only 
provide a summary of the key themes. The bibliography should provide all of the 
details for follow up study.
Methodology
The requirements of this review are threefold and are provided by the Emergency 
Planning College:
1) Identify key public inquiry reports for review which have taken place after UK 
disasters.
(Focus on those conducted by Judges, rather than HSE or Royal Commission 
reports.)
2) Review the existence and extent of previous work in this area.
3) Conduct literature review on substantive issues and barriers to learning.
To obtain this material the library at the Emergency Planning College was used 
extensively. Journal searching was undertaken using a variety of databases 
including Westlaw and Athens. 
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Two semi structured interviews were also conducted with subject matter experts Dr 
Brian Toft and Eve Coles.
This review was designed to a brief and accessible summary that would provide
indicators for further study. It will be distributed to delegates attending the Public 
Inquiries course at the Emergency Planning College and will be supported by 
teaching sessions on this issue.
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I) Summary of Key Themes
1. Recurrent themes within the inquiry reports: Failings 
This is a summary of the analysis provided in Chapter III. The material gathered  
there was analysed by the author for recurrent themes and these included: 
1 The lack of Integrated Emergency Management
2 Communication Failings
3 Failures relating to operational arrangements/ Incident Management/ 
Command and Control/ Leadership
4 “Safety Culture” and safety failings before, during and after the disaster
Provision of First Aid
Failings/ Lack of Safety Equipment
5 Event Management, Crowd Safety Management
6 The need for improved care and management of all people including 
responders
Issues with the Disaster Victim Identification process
7 The need for Risk Assessment: before and during the disaster
8 Training Needs: Either specific to task e.g. rail signalling or training in 
9 The need for improved emergency planning/ 
In some cases plans did not exist at all
10 “Weakness” within legislation
NB: When scrutinising plans, training and near misses it is also essential to 
remember a key finding that analysis of inquiry recommendations has 
shown that only around 20% of recommendations are technical while 
up to 80% are concerned with social, administrative or managerial 
issues.
As you will be aware, all of these issues are not unfamiliar and there have been 
many attempts to address them.
After disaster, there have been changes to Health and Safety and Event 
Management legislation. 
More recently the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 set out the principles of Integrated 
Emergency Management and placed the requirement for improved and effective 
planning, including risk assessment, on a statutory footing. It can be a useful 
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exercise to link the themes from the inquiry reports with the way in which this Act 
has been drafted.
The care and management of people affected by disaster is now addressed through 
various guidance documents including “Responding to Emergencies” and 
“Humanitarian Assistance in Emergencies”. When many of these inquiry reports 
were written, the police had not yet established their Family Liaison system which 
now plays a vital role after disaster and there are also formal arrangements in place 
to manage the identification process.
All of this material is available as pdfs through www.ukresilience.info.
2. Recurrent themes within the literature: Barriers to learning from Inquiry 
Reports
This is a summary of the analysis provided in Chapter IV. The material gathered 
there was analysed by the author for recurrent themes. This outlines factors that 
may prevent both organisations and individuals from “buying in” to the findings of an 
inquiry, or may weaken the inquiry’s recommendations. These issues have been 
repeatedly raised in the literature, but of course, not all of them would have easy 
solutions. Less tangible concerns such as political context can be very hard to 
address and discord will often follow disaster. 
Also, the implications of these themes reach much wider than looking to improve 
emergency plans/ planning in one area but have ramifications for many different 
projects e.g. a “Recovery Working Group” that has been established after disaster 
could utilise the issues of multiple realities, apportionment of blame, risk perception 
etc in their own work.
1 Problems with the Recommendations e.g.:
· Influenced by hindsight,
· They may be too broad or too narrow
· They may not have taken into account the wider picture
· They do not necessarily need to be acted upon
This is also linked to the issue of Terms of Reference being either too broad 
or too narrow.
2 Having to strike the right balance between the requirements of different 
parties
3 “Hindsight Bias”-being wise after the event
4 The nature of the organisation and its safety culture/ willingness to learn 
lessons
5 Context e.g. historical, political and social factors
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6 Failure to recognise disasters as “predictable” or “preventable”
7 “Multiple Realities” of the different parties
Risk perception
Not being able to make sense of events
8 The apportionment of blame
The creation of “Heroes and Villains”
The belief that the purpose of an inquiry is to apportion blame and to identify 
scapegoats. The process may also be seen as providing a protective screen to 
protagonists who can legitimately refuse to comment until the inquiry is complete.
9 Impartiality
Bias e.g. because of the political context, the judicial appointment etc
10 Complexity and Structure of the Inquiry Process
· Way in which the Inquiry was established
· The Inquiry’s status as “quasi-legal”
· Lack of clarity over the purpose of the Inquiry
· Terms of Reference: too broad or too narrow
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II) Context
It is important to place the public inquiry in a wider legal context and also introduce some 
of the factors that have made the public inquiries process a controversial one.
Legislative Processes and Definitions
There are diverse systems in place to inquire into the causes of death and disaster in the 
United Kingdom. These may include:
1) Coroner’s Inquests 
The Coroner will inquire into any sudden, unnatural or violent death, and the Office of the 
Coroner dates back to medieval times. The Coroner’s Inquest will focus on the identity of 
the deceased and when, where and how the death happened. The Coroner plays a pivotal 
role in the aftermath of disaster. The Office of the Coroner is undergoing substantial 
change at the moment and the different purposes of an Inquest and an Inquiry are often 
confused. Further information on the role of the Coroner can be found at www.dca.gov.uk
and www.coroner.org.uk (the website of the Coroner’s Society) and by reading 
Wells, C. (2005) Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters, Sweet and Maxwell.
2) Criminal and Civil Cases
After many disasters we have seen years of litigation. These may be heard before a 
criminal court such as charges relating to HSE offences and corporate manslaughter. 
Civil cases may also be brought e.g. between an employee and their employer, a 
bereaved family and the company involved, in an effort to obtain damages or the release 
of information.
3) Inquiries in their various forms-see below
After disasters, one of the accusations levelled at the legal process is that it is prone to 
duplication and may expose those affected by the disaster to a “secondary disaster” or
“legal aftermath.”
Historical Context
The British Legal framework is sometimes challenged as not being fit for purpose based 
on factors such as its longevity, and the arrangements for public inquiries are no different; 
Elliott asks “Is an instrument born of the late nineteenth century suited to the demands of 
the early twenty-first century” (Elliott and McGuiness, 2002, P.14)
After disaster there was an assumption that there was a system in place to simply 
“activate” a public inquiry. However prior to 2005 there was no one system as such.
Definition of a Public Inquiry
One of the most common themes within the reviews in this area has been a discussion of 
the lack of clarity over what a “public inquiry” actually is; 
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Toft and Reynolds state that Inquiries have developed in a rather piecemeal way (Toft and 
Reynolds, 2005, P.42)
“Within the United Kingdom, the public inquiry is the generic term used to describe 
mechanisms for investigating high profile disastrous incidents. Inquiries may be triggered 
by high magnitude, low probability events, although factors including the degree of media 
coverage, multiple fatalities, unknown causes, suspicion of a breakdown in safety systems 
and the need for public reassurance may also be crucial in determining whether or not a 
public inquiry is initiated or not”
(Hutter, 1992; Wells, 1995 in Elliott and McGuiness, 2002, P.14)
Establishing a Public Inquiry
Prior to the Inquiries Act 2005 there were three main ways that a public inquiry could be 
established:
1) Some statutes contain arrangements for mandatory technical inquiries to be 
established after a disaster e.g. Air disasters can be inquired into using the Civil 
Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations 1993 which states that “the 
fundamental purpose of investigating accidents shall be determine the circumstances 
and causes of the accident with a view to the preservation of life and the avoidance of 
accidents in the future.”
The Inquiry into the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise was held under section 55 
of the Merchant Shipping Act 1970 which allows the ordering of a formal investigation.
2) Ad hoc Inquiries were set up where there was no specific provision for accident 
investigation. A government minister such as the Home Secretary would appoint a 
judge to conduct an Inquiry as was the case with the Hillsborough Disaster.
3) The final way in which Inquiries could be set up was using the Tribunals of Inquiry Act 
1921. These carry great weight and require the authorisation of both Houses of 
Parliament to approve that the matter is ‘of urgent public importance’. They are always 
chaired by a senior judge and exercise High Court powers.
A government minister would appoint an independent investigator, usually a senior judge, 
to distance the government from the mechanics of the process and to demonstrate 
impartiality.
Examples of Types of Inquiry
Bradford Judicial, General, High Court Judge
Herald of Free Enterprise Judicial, Statutory, High Court Judge
Piper Alpha Technical AND Judicial
King’s Cross Judicial, Statutory, Queen’s Counsel
Hillsborough Judicial, General, Court of Appeal Judge 
Clapham Judicial, Statutory, High Court Judge
Marchioness Technical AND Judicial
Dunblane 1921 Tribunal of Inquiry
As the inquiry may be set up under a variety of auspices, the proceedings and Terms of 
Reference can vary hugely.
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Proceedings within a Public Inquiry
Public Inquiry is a term used to describe a variety of structures to enquire into disasters 
using either judicial or technical processes. The judicial inquiries which have formed the 
focus of this review are usually high profile, held in public and will be chaired by a Judge or 
a Senior Queen’s Counsel. They are separate from other criminal and civil proceedings:
“There is no accused and, therefore, no prosecution or defence; their findings being drawn 
from a wide range of written and oral evidence.”
(Scraton,2000, P.118)
This is not a trial, there is no claim or counter claim, or burden of proof although there can 
be allocation of blame which may serve to inflame proceedings. The public inquiry uses an 
inquisitorial approach as opposed to an adversarial one (an adversarial approach is used 
in courts during criminal and civil cases.) Sometimes this structure has been described as 
“quasi-legal” and an accusation that has been levelled at public inquiries is that it does try 
to apportion blame implicitly.
“The central aim of the inquiry is the collection of evidence and fact finding.”
(Peay,1996 and Bradley and Ewing, 1998 in Elliott and McGuiness, 2002, P.14)
Inquiries also provide recommendations for future practice.
Terms of Reference
Before the inquiry commences terms of reference covering the parameters of discussion 
and the scope for reform are normally determined, but these may be extremely broad.
The terms of reference for the Piper Alpha disaster were simply “An Inquiry to establish 
the circumstances of the accident and its cause.”
Conversely the terms of reference can also be narrow and therefore are unable to place 
the disaster in a wider context, such as political, economic and social factors at the time. 
This can lead to accusations that the final inquiry report is superficial.
The Need for a Public Inquiry
A public inquiry can broadly be seen as a way of answering the need to firstly establish 
causes of a disaster and secondly recommend preventative measures for the future. 
Lessons learned can be identified and actions can be taken to improve safety.
For the people affected by disaster, a public inquiry is also an important part of accepting 
and acknowledging that the disaster has occurred. This process is often seen as 
fundamental to recovery (and this can be seen as having parallels with the Truth and 
Reconciliation Committees held after genocides etc.) 
Recommendations
The inquiry often makes many recommendations but there is no requirement for a 
government to act on the findings of a public inquiry. Often recommendations from 
different inquiries over many years appear depressingly similar and the obvious 
explanation for this would be that lessons are repeatedly not learned. Reviewers have also 
pointed out that recommendations may appear very similar because often the Terms of 
Reference of the inquiry are also similar.
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Inquiries Act 2005
The Inquiries Act 2005 is an attempt to modernise the law on statutory inquiries and 
address many of the issues raised above.
It will give Public Inquires a statutory framework, replaces over 30 pieces of previous 
legislation and codifies past practice.
The Acts states that “A Minister may cause an inquiry to be held under this Act in relation 
to a case where it appears to him that - (a) particular events have caused, or are capable 
of causing, public concern, or (b) there is public concern that particular events may have 
occurred.”
It will be used for “any inquiry set up by the Government to look into a past event, or series 
of events, that has caused - or has been capable of causing - public concern, for example, 
inquiries like the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, or the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. These sorts of 
inquiries have generally been triggered by events - such as a death, an accident or an 
alleged criminal act - but have tended to focus not on the events themselves but on the 
possible failures in systems and services that allowed them to happen.” (DCA, 2007 - See 
website link below.)
A set of Frequently Asked Questions about this Act is available at 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/legist/faq.htm
Criticism of the Inquiries Act 2005
The Inquiries Act 2005 has not been without its critics. 
In a joint statement by a number of Human Rights Organisations and The Law Society 
(2005) it is stated that:
“The fundamental problem contained in the Inquiries Bill is its shift in emphasis towards 
inquiries established and largely controlled by government Ministers. This shift is achieved 
by the repeal of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 and the terms of several of 
the Bill’s clauses. These clauses grant broad powers to the Minister establishing an inquiry 
on issues such as the setting of the terms of reference, restrictions on funding for an 
inquiry, suspension or termination of an inquiry, restrictions on public access to inquiry 
proceedings and to evidence submitted to an inquiry, and restrictions on public access to 
the final report of an inquiry. The Bill does not grant the independence to inquiry chairs 
and panels that has made their role so crucial in examining issues, particularly where 
public confidence has been undermined.”
Political Context
Both the inquiry and the disaster will often have a political context:
“Some of the people closely involved with inquiries…have argued that such inquiries are 
not always the formalised, objective, truth searching bodies of the common public 
perception. Public Inquiries have no laid down formal procedures, are adversarial in 
nature, have no power to require organisations or individuals to carry out their 
recommendations, and may sometimes apparently have hidden political agendas to 
address”
(Toft and Reynolds, 2005, P.127)
“Public Inquiries, by their very nature, are official responses to controversial cases. 
Inevitably, they are surrounded by allegations and counter-allegations raising serious 
matters of responsibility and liability.”
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(Scraton, 2000, P.118)
The disaster itself may also have a political and historical context such as the crowd 
management issues that provided a backdrop to the Hillsborough disaster and the 
privatisation of the railways which was cited as a causative factor in the Paddington and 
Southall rail disasters.
Apportionment of Blame
Under the Inquiries Act 2005, as with the previous arrangements in this area, there will still 
be no apportionment of either civil or criminal liability. This is because there are other 
arrangements under British Law for these decisions to be made. However this will not 
prevent similar controversies to those that have arisen in the past e.g. anger from families 
that inquiries have not delivered on their original promises.
“Heroes and Villains”
After disaster, the various parties may be treated in very different ways;
“A public discourse of shock, sympathy, blame and accountability tends to be orchestrated 
through the media and a well-rehearsed narrative is imported which polarises the ‘heroes’ 
and the ‘villains’, regardless of the appropriateness of these constructions. This not only 
has implications for the emotional healing processes of survivors but means that the 
issues surrounding these disasters and their consequences persist for the bereaved.”
(Eyre, 1998, P.2)
The Role of Judges in Public Inquiries
The role of judges in public inquiries has been controversial. Sometimes governments 
have been accused of playing safe with their choices;
“Cullen was chosen to head this inquiry [Ladbroke Grove] because he is a safe bet. He is 
pragmatic, business-friendly and above all he can be trusted not to unsettle the agenda 
that has already been set by government.”
(Whyte, 1999, P.1)
Lord Cullen was again criticised after the inquiry into the Dunblane shootings as he 
allowed the Police to investigate their own actions with regard to awarding a licence to 
Thomas Hamilton. He was also criticised for allowing some material to be locked away 
from public view under a 100 year seal. After Piper Alpha he was accused of accepting the 
evidence of the oil companies on the shape of the safety regime that was to regulate them.
Elliott and McGuinness,2002, explore a number of reasons why judges may not be ideal 
and these include an idealised view of the skills of judges, they may be accused of bias 
due to their social background and their “neutrality” may be questioned. They also 
examine issues around the selection and training of the appropriate judges.
Resourcing Inquiries
Inquiries can last several months and even years and may involve the appearance of 
hundreds of witnesses and the submission of thousands of documents.
Case Study One: Lord Taylor’s Inquiry into the Hillsborough Disaster
174 main witnesses
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“Evidence” Phone Lines were opened which took 3000 calls in 6 days
Interested parties were divided into nine categories (e.g. Football Assoc, 
Council, Police, Bereaved, Injured)
3776 Statements and 1550 Letters
Case Study Two: Mr Fennell QC’s Inquiry into the King’s Cross Fire
The Inquiry lasted 91 days
150 witnesses were cross examined
80,000 documents were studied.
Case Study Three: Lord Saville’s Inquiry into Bloody Sunday
Estimated cost of £155 million
921 witnesses have given oral evidence
1555 statements have been read
The Inquiries Act 2005 has been designed to address these issues but resources are still 
used as a reason against holding inquiries. This has appeared most recently in media 
coverage discussing the case against holding an inquiry into the terrorist bombings on July
7th 2005 (see discussion at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5370666.stm) and previously 
critics have suggested that money spent on inquiries would be better spent on other 
measures such as installing smoke alarms. Those affected by disasters have often 
reacted angrily to these statements; they agree that spending needs to be controlled but 
also state that an inquiry was “essential” and their only way to find out the truth
(Wright, 2003.)
Implementation of Recommendations
“The perceived strength of a public inquiry is that its recommendations carry the weight of 
a costly and in-depth investigation drawing on a mass of unsolicited as well as requested 
evidence and opinion. Further, findings are derived in rigorous cross-examination of key 
witnesses by lawyers representing the interests of all parties. Seen as ‘independent’ and 
commissioned by government, the assumption is that their recommendations will be 
treated with respect and implemented.’
(Scraton, 2000, P.118)
It is a depressing fact that not all recommendations made at inquiries are implemented 
with potentially catastrophic consequences; for example it has been argued that had the
recommendations of the Popplewell report been introduced, the Hillsborough disaster may 
never have happened (see Wells, 1995, P.71)
Lord Howe provides a commentary of this issue and asks how can we ensure that the 
lessons of the inquiry are actually put into practice. One suggestion was that on the 
Public Inquiries: Thematic Review
Emergency Planning College
Lucy Easthope 2007
15
anniversary of the publication of the inquiry report there should be an audit presented on 
the progress made towards implementing all of the recommendations.
The Bichard Inquiry, set up to examine the actions of police and other agencies prior to the 
murder of two school girls in Soham provides a modern model for inquiries which clearly 
sets out both the recommendations and also names the agency that is responsible for 
implementing them. The inquiry was also re-convened at a later day to analyse progress 
of implementing the recommendations. This inquiry report is available at:
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/pdf/bichard_report.pdf
The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry Report (Initial Action Plan November 2001) also provides 
an example for emergency planners, which demonstrates the way in which 
recommendations can be allocated to individuals and given time scales. This can be 
viewed at http://www.rail.reg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.1204.
Better utilisation of Inquiry Information
Toft and Reynolds argue that public inquiries are likely to remain the most prominent form 
of disaster inquiry and it is essential that the best use is made of any recommendations. 
(Toft and Reynolds, 2005, P.127)
Disasters without Inquiries:
“Major disasters are almost inevitably followed by some sort of Inquiry”
(Wells, 1995, P.71)
However as recent events have shown this does not always need to be the kind of public 
inquiry that has been discussed most frequently in this review. Following the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami in December 2004 and the London terrorist attacks in July 2005 a different 
approach has been adopted where research and “lessons learned” have been gathered 
and reported upon. 
July 7th and calls for a public inquiry
“The judge-driven public inquiry is a part of English legal mythology. It is the panacea for 
all ills. Only do what an English judge, after hearing evidence over a period of weeks or 
months, tells us to do, and democracy and freedom will be saved forever. Unfortunately, it 
does not always work like that.”
(Matthews, 1999, P.418)
Some survivors and bereaved have called for a public inquiry into the terrorist attacks on 
July 7th 2005, and it does appear that this would be something that the Inquiries Act 2005 
could be used for.
“We wanted an impartial, honest inquiry chaired by someone independent of government 
and the Security Services. An inquiry which had the power to cross-examine witnesses 
and compel evidence, that could talk to all the stakeholders and agencies involved in 7/7 
and make recommendations. Above all, it would reassure the public that lessons had been 
learnt that we would all be safer in the future.”
(North, 2007, P.3)
Joint Inquiry into the Grayrigg and Potters Barr train disasters
There have also been calls for a Public Inquiry into two recent train disasters:
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“A High Court judge has called for an Inquiry into possible links between last Friday’s fatal 
train crash in Cumbria and the rail disaster at Potters Bar five years ago.
Mr Justice Sullivan assigned to conduct the inquest into the seven deaths at Potters Bar, 
said yesterday that similarities between the crashes could not be ignored.” (Webster, 
2007, P.23)
Public Inquiries: Thematic Review
Emergency Planning College
Lucy Easthope 2007
17
III) Key Weaknesses and Repeated Failures highlighted by Inquiries
“A desire to learn lessons from disasters appears to be central 
to the public inquiry process”
(Elliott and McGuiness, 2002, P.16)
In the first tables below, are the key issues raised in both the main body of the inquiry 
reports and within the recommendations. The author has analysed these for repetition and 
similarities so that cogent themes can be highlighted.
The second table provides a retrospective analysis; examining literature that commented 
upon the disaster, or changes in legislation that occurred shortly afterwards. Again the key 
themes can be linked together and reinforce the findings of the first analysis.
As an introduction to the idea of repeated failings after disaster, it can be useful to be 
mindful of two overarching principles, identified by authors such as Pidgeon and Turner 
and Toft and Reynolds:
1) Disasters are socio-technical in nature as opposed to solely or even mainly, technical. 
In the Public Inquiry recommendations those relating to ‘social’ factors are always 
greater in number than ‘technical’ factors
2) Evidence strongly suggests that it is usually failures in organisational arrangements 
which ultimately lead to technical failure
(Toft and Reynolds, 2005, P.129)
Key Themes taken from the Inquiry Reports and Recommendations
1985: Bradford City 
Fire and 
Birmingham 
Wall
Collapse
Identification of Problems (Risk Assessment)
Inspection and Tests
Design - Ingress and egress to/from the ground, Terraces and Stands, 
Fences, Stairways and Ramps
Fire Precautions 
Fire Fighting Equipment
Communications - public address systems, alarms, CCTV
Crowd Behaviour
Management Responsibilities - checklists for emergency procedures, 
responsibilities
Training
Revisions to safety certificate arrangements
This report also highlights earlier and very similar recommendations from 
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other reports
1987: King’s Cross
Underground
Fire
Police Actions - Police decision to move passengers up from the platform
to the surface with tragic results. These decisions were taken 
independently by Police Officers without seeking advice from London 
Transport staff or other management. Only through communication with
the specialists in underground fire behaviour could the police have
realised the danger at the time.
(Suggesting parallels with Hillsborough-author’s emphasis)
Historical Context - Fires had become common place for London 
Underground staff so it may not have been perceived as a legitimate threat. 
There had been 46 escalator fires between 1956 and 1988 and in two 
instances the cause was attributed to smoker’s materials. 
Safety – Fire Certification requires review.
Training - London Underground had no evacuation plan and no system 
to train staff in fire drill or evacuation.
Communications - Up to date telephone system, message recording/ timing 
system needed.
Public address equipment to be improved.
Radio equipment must be compatible between British Transport Police and 
London Fire Brigade.
Station Operations Room
CCTV – to be improved
Management Failings - The Chairman of London Regional Transport and 
the Chief Executive of London Underground both resigned upon publication
of the report.
Legislative breaches - Smoking had been banned since February 1985 
but the ban was not thoroughly enforced.
Maintenance - Escalator cleaning was supposed to take place every 8 months 
but in fact took place every 11 months.
Maintenance, repair and monitoring of electrics was deficient.
Poor condition of waterfog equipment and nozzles.
Fire Fighting Equipment - Fire fighting equipment was concealed behind 
wooden hoardings.
Design - The ceiling of the ticket hall was 3ft lower than necessary, and the 
ceiling was coated with a highly combustible paint which also emitted a 
Thick, black smoke.
Management - Reliable records of fires were not kept
Integrated Emergency Management (author’s interpretation) –
e.g. London Fire Brigade and London Underground to produce and 
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maintain up to date station plans and place them in boxes at agreed locations.
Exchange of information at time of incident.
Training – Inadequate fire and emergency training given to staff. 
Programme of continuing instruction by supervisors to be established
Planning – No established evacuation plan
1987: Herald of Free 
 Enterprise
The response from the emergency services, the Belgian people and the people 
living in and around Zeebrugge was described as magnificent.
Engineering and Design - simple indicator lights that would have told 
the Captain that the bow doors were shut had previously been refused.
Bulkheads would have slowed the vessel’s capsize
Review of Stability Books ordered.
Modifications of vehicles built under the 1965 rules.
Reporting of Accidents
Responsibility - [The Captain] was seriously negligent in the discharge of 
his duties.
Management Failings - All concerned in management …were guilty of fault 
in that all must be regarded as sharing responsibility for the failure of 
management.
From top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of 
sloppiness.
(The Inquiry report contains detailed analysis of the role of management, 
see pages 14-15.)
Safety - The future: Bridge Indicator Lights
The future: Systems for licensing ships and operators
The future: Strong and consistent managerial involvement in all aspects of 
safety.
CCTV- Valuable addition. Should be considered.
Employees - Treatment of employees.
Working Hours and Systems that are responsive to the needs of employees
Monitoring of difficulties
Stability of Personnel and regular team meetings will support team work. 
Constant changes of staff meant that on the HOFE teamwork simply could not 
be developed.
Avenue for complaints
Report stressed the need for:
a) clear and concise orders
b) Strict discipline
c) Attention at all times to all matters affecting the safety of the ship and 
those on board. There must be no ‘cutting of corners.’
d) The maintenance of proper channels of communication between ship 
and shore for the receipt and dissemination of information
e) A clear and firm management and command structure
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For further interpretation of these recommendations see:
Crainer, S. (1993)  
Zeebrugge, Learning from Disaster: Lessons in Corporate Responsibility.
Herald Families Association
1988: Piper Alpha Safety- The operator should be required by regulation to submit to the
regulatory body a Safety Case in respect of each of its installations 
(The recommendations then set out detailed requirements for this 
Safety Case.)
Support for Safety Committee and Safety Representatives
Permits to Work
Incident Reporting
Control of the Incident – Control Rooms, Emergency Centres and Systems
Command of the Incident
Fire detection equipment
Fire Protection
Evacuation - Escape Routes, Accommodation
Facilities for evacuation, evacuation into the sea
Helicopters
Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft
Standby Vessels
Safety Equipment – Personal survival and escape equipment
Pipeline Emergency Procedures
Training and Exercising
Regulation – There should be a single regulatory body for offshore safety
1988: Clapham Rail 
Crash
Operational - wiring, testing etc
Technical Training
Employees - Working hours, monitoring overtime
Recruitment and Retention
Management of Staff
Safety Monitoring
Quality Management and Audit
Safety Culture
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Reporting of Signal Failures
Communications (from an Emergency Services perspective ) –
Emergency Services dedicated phone line, 
Emergency Services to carry out Major Incident simulations,
Including Hospitals in Major Incident Warnings as soon as possible, 
training of hospital switchboard operators, Radio Communication
Site Management - The wearing of PPE, tabards with names of service 
on them.
Communications (from British Rail perspective) –
Direct lines and emergency dialling systems
Public address systems
Casualty Bureaux
Command and Control – Primacy of the Civil Police when there is no fire
Integrated Emergency Management (author’s interpretation) – e.g. between 
emergency services and British Rail
Care of People – The Police Forces should study the excellent arrangements 
made by the Metropolitan Police for the bereaved and relatives of the 
seriously injured
Emergency Planning - Department of Health to review plans in conjunction 
with Medical and Emergency Services
1989: Hillsborough Operations on the day - The immediate cause of the disaster was the failure 
to cut off access to the central pens once gate C had been opened.
Lack of Leadership
Planning - Congestion at the turnstiles should have been anticipated and 
planned for.
First Aid, Medical Facilities and Ambulance e.g. one trained first aider per 1000 
spectators, fully equipped ambulance.
Care of People - Delay in informing relatives, Lack of Information
Processes for Identification: Families viewed polaroids and their loved ones 
in the gymnasium
Future safety recommendations-All seated accommodation, 
National Inspectorate And Review body, Maximum capacity for terraces, 
Filling and monitoring terraces,
Gangways, fences and gates.
Police Planning
Communications-sufficient operators in the control room, reserved command 
channel. Illuminated advertising boards to address the crowd.
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Command and Control
Offences and Penalties-pitch invasion, abuse, throwing missiles, selling tickets 
Without authority
Green Guide-Required revision
1989: Marchioness The first Inquiry into the Marchioness disaster was held in 1990.
This was conducted in private and established by the 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch. 
The families and the Marchioness Action Group campaigned for many 
years to have a Public Inquiry and this was finally established in 2000.
Reports by Lord Clarke were published between 1999 and 2001. 
They first evaluated the case for an inquiry and the issues that were likely to be 
explored. The final inquiries reported into two related areas:
1) Formal Investigation into the Collision and the Search and Rescue 
  Operation that followed 
2) The  Identification of Victims following Major Transport Disasters
Collision and the Search and Rescue Operation: 
Alcohol, Drugs - e.g. alcohol abuse aboard waterborne vehicles  
Employees- Fatigue  
Search and Rescue (SAR) - In 1989, no one including the police, had the legal 
responsibility either to determine what SAR resources were required or to 
provide and pay for them. 
SAR arrangements were to b kept under review with the Royal National 
Lifeboat Institution to provide cover
Suggestion of a Statutory duty to provide and co-ordinate these services
Safety 
Risk Assessment
Training – For Watermen and Lightermen
Training – for emergencies
Accident Investigation – Data and other recording equipment
Legislation – Changes to Marine By-Laws and examination of the role of the 
MAIB
Lord Clarke also made a number of recommendations bout the way public 
inquiries should be established in the future
Identification of Victims:
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Care of People - Delay in informing relatives, Lack of Information
Local Authority Social Services to draw up plans for the care of the bereaved
Emergency Planning – The Home Office should ensure that all agencies 
likely to be involved in the aftermath of major disasters are made aware 
of the need for Contingency Planning
Process of Identification: Invasive techniques such as removal of hands.
Lord Clarke set out a number of principles that responders should be mindful 
of after disasters:
1) Provision of honest and, as far as possible, accurate information 
 at all times and at every stage
2) Respect for the deceased and the bereaved
3) A sympathetic and caring approach throughout; and
4) The avoidance of mistaken identification
Establishment of a Rights Based Approach
Training – Training of Coroners
Casualty Bureau
The role of the Family Liaison Officer
Senior Identification Manager- The appointment of a Senior Identification 
Manager with overall responsibility for the identification process
Integrated Emergency Management (author’s interpretation) – For Mass 
Fatality Management
1996: Dunblane Care of People – Delay in informing relatives, Lack of Information
Facilities for those waiting for information: “cramped and overcrowded room”
Identification of Victims
Training – Police
Management of Cordons
Allocation of Fire Arms Licences
Police failings in this area
1997: Southall Rail
Crash
Risk Assessment – Any change in regulation must be preceded by 
risk assessment
Evacuation – Avoid distressing scenes, should people be sent onward by train
Medical – More effective liaison with hospitals and casualty gathering areas 
Care of People – Delay in informing relatives, Lack of Information, 
Identification of Victims should be “speeded up”, 
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Casualty Bureaux – Procedures to be reviewed
Post accident debriefing
Inquiries into Disasters - “one stop” investigation of disasters
Driver Training - Inadequate
Operational
Fault Reporting
Maintenance – Fleet and Infrastructure
Design – Vehicles,
Research and Development
Safety - Procedures must not become divorced from reality
Accident Investigation and Inquiries
Privatisation of the Rail Industry - The fragmentation of the industry had 
resulted in some confusion and inconsistencies in safety procedures which 
must now be put right
See discussion at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/655723.stm
A review of compliance after six months was also recommended by
Professor Uff
1999: Ladbroke
Grove
Taken from Part One of the Inquiry:
Risk Assessment - assessing all relevant issues when a change is proposed
Operational - Signalling, Track management, Signal Sighting
Driver Management and Training - Train Operating Companies should review 
the effectiveness of the systems in place to deliver the training
Training - Emergency Evacuation and Protection
Blame Culture - The development of a culture within the industry in which 
information is communicated without fear of recrimination
Understanding of Human Factors
Safety Audit Process
Communications - safety information available to passengers, 
emergency facilities onboard the trains, emergency signs to be made 
luminous, on board safety announcements, emergency signs should be 
understood without having to be read, common signage for all trains in 
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Great Britain. Passenger-signaller communication.
Roaming communication systems, remote broadcasting.
Pictograms-similar to those used by airlines
Safety equipment - Emergency Lighting Systems that can be safeguarded from 
disablement, the provision of “snap wands” to provide lighting, emergency 
Hammers.
Design - Internal doors, ladders, removable windows, the possibility of escape 
hatches
2001: The Joint Inquiry 
into Train
Protection
 Systems
Operational – Train Protection Systems
Some additional Themes emerging from reviews, changes in the law and litigation, 
commentary etc
1985: Bradford City 
Fire and 
Birmingham 
Wall
Collapse
Legislative Changes - 1987: Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act 
was introduced
1987: Herald of Free               
Enterprise
Acceptable corporate behaviour - “Zeebrugge proved that it is unacceptable,
in any business, to wait for the product or machine to go wrong before 
taking action.”
(Crainer, 1993, 156)
Statutory Changes - Development of the Department of Transport Marine 
Accident Investigation Branch
Legislative Changes -
“Corporate Responsibility”
The need for review of corporate manslaughter legislation
The role of the Inquest -
The role of the Inquest e.g. not to apportion blame
Jury inquest returned a verdict of unlawful killing
See Crainer, S. (1993)  Zeebrugge, Learning from Disaster: Lessons in Corporate 
Responsibility. Herald Families Association.
1987: King’s Cross 
Fire
Isomorphic Learning  - There was no satisfactory analysis carried out on common
factors/ trends on the behaviour of fires.
Recommendations from previous incidents have not been acted upon
Professor Ed Borodzicz provides a detailed analysis on this disaster 
in his book : Borodzicz, E. (2005) Risk, Crisis and Security Management. Wiley.
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1988: Piper Alpha No Criminal Actions brought
Command and Control - ‘The explosion on Piper Alpha that led to the 
disaster was not devastating. We shall never know but it probably killed 
only a small number of men. As the resulting fire spread, most of the 
workforce made their way to the accommodation where they expected 
someone would be in charge and would lead them to safety.
Apparently, they were disappointed. It seems the whole system of
command had broken down.’
(Sefton, 1994)
Management Failings - Serious criticism of Management
Risk Assessment - The offshore safety regime at the time 
did not require that risks were assessed. 
Potentially hazardous events had been envisaged, but Occidental did not 
require them to be assessed systematically.
After the Cullen Report responsibility for oil rig safety was transferred to 
the HSE.
The HSE budget was increased
Safety - New technology (including personal locators, homing direction 
finders, transponders etc) personal survival equipment and 
arrangements for helicopters, standby vessels and Fast Rescue Crafts.
Training and Exercising - Training and exercising of Offshore Installation 
Managers and Controllers was introduced.
Selection Criteria - A selection criteria for Offshore Installation Managers 
was introduced
1988: Clapham Rail 
Crash
No criminal charges were brought
Jury Inquest returned a verdict of unlawful killing
1989: Hillsborough Historical Context - The erroneous fateful belief that a disaster could not 
strike twice 
(following the Bradford City fire)
Had the recommendations of Lord Popplewell, made after the Bradford
City Fire, been carried out then Hillsborough may never have happened
Political / Social Context - The policing of football matches. Vilification of 
Liverpool fans. This was strongly challenged by Lord Taylor.
System Failures after years of complacency - see discussions 
by Turner and Scraton
Safety Culture - Establishment of a Football Licensing Authority
Safety - Conversion to all seated stadia
Upgrades to Britain’s football grounds
Regulation by Football Licensing Authority
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All seat rule imposed
First Response - Arrangements for First Aid and Triage
Training - Strategies for Training Senior Officers
Legal definition of PTSD
Failed Prosecutions
Care of People - Further analysis of the rights of those affected by disaster.
See Scraton, 1999.
1989: Marchioness Changes in Responsibility - From 2002 the Coastguard took over 
responsibility for co-ordination of Search and Rescue on the Thames 
up to Teddington Lock.
Failed Prosecutions - Juries in two trials could not reach a verdict
“Lord Clarke Compliance” – Disaster Victim Identification in the UK
Invasive Techniques e.g. see Hinsliff, G. (2001) .No excuse for Marchioness 
mutilations. The Observer, 11th March reproduced at 
www.observer.co.uk/Print/0,3858 as at 1st September 2003
The development of a Rights based approach for the bereaved after disaster (e.g. 
the right to view the deceased, the right to information, the right to visit the site, the 
right to the return of personal effects etc-visit www.disasteraction.org.uk for further 
information.)
1996: Dunblane Legislative Changes - There was a change in the law in 1997 making it illegal to buy 
or possess a handgun
Security - Effective security in schools
See discussion at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4798290.stm
1997: Southall Failed Prosecutions – Manslaughter charges against the driver and the train operator 
were dropped
1999: Ladbroke 
Grove
Previous recommendations - Media reports suggested that the Paddington disaster 
might have been averted by the implementation of the safety 
measures, identified in the 1989 Clapham investigation
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IV) Barriers to Learning from Public Inquiries
1) Introduction to the material:
Governmental Reviews
Public inquiries have been the subject of recent governmental attention. In 2004 a review 
of their effectiveness was published by the Public Administration Select Committee;
Their review recognised that while inquiries had helped to bring about valuable and 
welcome improvements, there had also been occasions where inquiries had been marred 
by procedural arguments and time and resource issues. The Inquiries Act 2005 was then 
introduced.
Academic Perspectives
Many writers in the field of emergency management have also included discussion of 
public inquiries within their work and these perspectives form a large part of this review.  
Full details of all the papers reviewed are included in the bibliography.
One procedural point to note is that many of these reviews took place prior to the 
introduction of the new Inquiries Act in 2005.
2) Barriers to Learning from Inquiry Reports: Key Themes
(Please note that full details of all the texts mentioned are included in the bibliography
Themes
The literature reviewed was analysed for key themes that emergency planners could use 
to understand why it might be difficult for their organisations to learn from public inquiries.
Even with the new legislation in this area (Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and Inquiries Act 
2005) these barriers could still continue to cause problems as they are often related to 
more intangible issues that are difficult to legislate for, such as political context, hindsight 
and different perspectives. It is therefore important that emergency planners apply them to 
their own work.
I. Recommendations
The public inquiry is only one step in the process of organisational learning from crisis 
although implicit is the assumption that learning swiftly follows the inquiry. This assumes 
that the recommendations will be rigorously acted upon but this is often not the case (see 
the discussion in Chapter II.)
Balancing Recommendations
Borodzicz (2005) states that the recommendations made have to strike the correct 
balance; on the one hand they must reflect the public’s need for catharsis and 
reassurance that similar events can be prevented. On the other hand any 
recommendations must also be politically workable so that they can be turned into 
guidelines and even legislation.
Elliot and McGuiness (2002) argue that without the force of the law it is unlikely that 
organisations will informally comply and that “active learning” requires the translation of 
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knowledge into action via changes to operating norms and procedures. This raises 
questions about the communication of the findings of public inquiries and the mechanisms 
by which organisations implement them
Failing to address all the events in the chain
“Disasters have complex pathologies usually involving system, safety and communication 
failures”
(Wells, 1995, P.1)
Public inquiry recommendations sometimes do not address all of the chains of events 
leading to the disasters under investigation. This implies that the recommendations, even 
if implemented in full, will fail to cut some of those chains if they recur in the future in the 
same or isomorphic systems.
II. Terms of Reference
According to Toft and Reynolds the inability of public inquiry participants to get particular 
issues raised often appears to stem from the setting of too narrow terms of reference.
Elliott and McGuinness (2002) also raise the issue that the scope of the inquiry can create 
barriers to learning. They look at the issue of focussing on “micro issues” which means 
that the inquiry investigates only the immediate circumstances of the accident but fails to 
consider the wider organisational, political, social and economic contexts.
Given the tight focus of the inquiry, it is not surprising that operator error is often raised as 
the key causative factor. There may be advantages in extending the focus of the inquiry as 
few disasters have simple causes and it is a concern that when human error is identified 
this is a key impediment to organisational learning (organisation’s may not have to face up 
to their own failings if it has been attributed to one operator).
Scraton (2002) argues that key stakeholders are omitted when terms of reference are set 
and that these can be influenced by the “early view” of what happened rather than a more 
holistic picture; those affected by the disaster have no input into the priorities and 
emphases of the inquiry. The Home Secretary or another government minister makes this 
decision.
III.“Hindsight Bias”
On being wise after the event
Professor Reason researches into the areas of human error, stress, organisational risk 
management etc. His comments on “hindsight bias” serve as a cautionary note for those 
seeking to learn from public inquiries. He also provides a very helpful review of a number 
of disaster case studies.Reason draws on the work of Fischoff and Slovic to illustrate that 
“outcome knowledge profoundly influences the way we survey past events”.
This phenomenon is called “hindsight bias” and has two aspects:
1) The “knew it all along” effect (also known as ‘creeping determinism’) whereby 
observers of past events exaggerate what other people should have been able 
to anticipate in foresight. If they were involved in these events, they tend to 
exaggerate what they themselves actually knew in foresight.
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2) Historical judges are largely unaware of the degree to which outcome 
knowledge influences their perceptions of the past. As a result, they 
overestimate what they would have known had they not possessed this 
knowledge.
(Reason, 1990, P.215)
The Historical Context
Establishing an historical context for the disaster is a reflective exercise informed by the 
benefit of hindsight.  It considers the long term background to, potential for and warnings 
of disaster. Often it reveals complacency and negligence underpinning a tragedy which 
was ‘waiting to happen’. The moment of disaster is not necessarily literal; it can be a 
‘second’-an explosion/ crash; it can encompass a period of time-a crush/sinking/a fire.
(Davis and Scraton, 1997, P.iv)
Hindsight and Recommendations
Turner and Pidgeon examined the nature of recommendations from public inquiries and 
they raise the issue of hindsight and recommendations stating that; 
“recommendations….are concerned to deal with the problem which caused the disaster as 
it is now revealed, and not to deal with the problem as it presented itself to those involved 
in it before the disaster.”
(Turner and Pidgeon, 1997, P.61)
Hindsight and the Preventable Disaster
Celia Wells has written extensively on the legal process after disaster.
She highlights a number of issues relating to the public inquiry; for example while it could 
be argued that inquiries are merely ways of responding with hindsight to unavoidable 
accidents, they also are a way of revealing warning signs which in fact mean that had 
those signs been recognised, the disaster would have been preventable (Wells, 1995, 
P.72)
(The Disaster Prevention Unit at the University of Bradford found in their study of 1000 
disasters since the nineteenth century that over 60 per cent could have been prevented.)
IV. A Complex Process
Borodzicz (2005) states that public inquiries are usually carried out in a highly formalised 
and even ritualistic way. Wells (1995) also highlights that the process of inquiring into 
disaster is not as simple as it may sound by applying a generic term such as “public 
inquiries” (as discussed above.)Instead she describes the structure as Labyrinthine (Wells, 
1995, P.72)
She states that there is no clear “public inquiry” system as such; inquiries may or may not 
be in public, English and Welsh legal institutions differ from those in Scotland and that the 
formal attribution of blame through the legal process is complex, contingent and variable.
(Wells, 1999, P.7)
V. Predictable Circumstances 
Sometimes the idea that disasters are caused by predictable circumstances is resisted by 
emergency planners, and we will often assume that each emergency is unique.
“Disasters are regularly caused by a coincidence of predictable circumstances coming 
together unexpectedly.”
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(Scraton, 2000, P.83)
Disasters with similar circumstances
The similar circumstances leading up to disasters that outwardly may appear very different 
are striking. This also strengthens the argument that emergency planners must broaden 
their opportunities to learn even if the disaster appears remote and unrelated. 
Elliott, Frosdick and Smith provide an insight into the way in which stadia disasters 
happened over and over again in the 1980s with a number of similarities:
Venue Year Casualties Type of Incident
Hillsborough (1981) 1981 38 injured Crowd Crush
Walsall 1984 20 injured Wall Collapse
Bradford 1985 54 dead Fire
Birmingham 1985 1 dead, 20 injured Disorder/ Wall collapse
Heysel (Brussels) 1985 38 dead, 400 injured Disorder/ Wall collapse
Easter Road 1987 150 injured Crowd Crush
Hillsborough (1989) 1989 96 dead, 400 injured Crowd Crush
Middlesborough 1989 19 injured Crowd Crush
Further insight about these similarities can also be found by reviewing Mr Justice Popplewell’s Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into Crowd Safety and Control at Sports Grounds and Lord Taylor’s Report into The 
Hillsborough Stadium disaster
VI. Political Context
“While incidents are regularly investigated by agencies such as the Health and Safety 
Executive, there are often calls for a ‘public inquiry’ if the tragedy is considered to have 
wider implications for the ‘public interest’.” (Scraton, 2000, P.118)
Conflict of Interest
The lessons that emerge from public inquiries and the need to “tell it like it is”, may be 
compromised when personal or corporate identities and liability are at stake. Even though 
the stated aims may be to allow witnesses to speak freely, giving evidence may 
subsequently cause one to be blamed or held personally liable and create a dangerous 
conflict of interest.
VII. Multiple Realities
Borodzicz (2005) states that people’s “realities” [e.g. views, perspectives and outlook] are 
different, and at a public inquiry conflicting accounts of reality are presented by those 
involved;
When telling their account of events, the witnesses present “multiple realities.” They may 
operate simultaneously and may not be compatible. However they are each valid accounts 
of events for those who have constructed them. Expert accounts are liable to disagree (as 
also seen in differing testimonies provided by expert witnesses in court cases.)
(Borodzicz, 2005, P. 201)
Different versions of “Truth”
Scraton argues that truth is “derived” and sustained within the dominant relations of power.
“As they set out to reconstruct public confidence, official inquiries more often than not 
become part of “official discourse, institutional processes and professional processes” 
which….are expressions of power which construct and legitimate self-serving versions of 
the truth.)
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(Scraton, 2004 also quoting Scraton, P.(2002) ‘Lost lives, hidden voices: ‘truth’ and 
controversial deaths’. Race and Class. Vol 44,No 1, P.109-118.)
Making Sense of Emergencies
People try and rationalise events leading up to or during a disaster, and make sense of 
what is happening but this will be framed by their own perspectives and experiences.
VIII. Risk Perception
People make decisions using their own judgement every day. Every risk assessment 
involves subjectivity and these decisions are influenced by our own past experiences. This 
also means that we “sanitise” our world of hazards so that we are not constantly worrying 
about the risks that we face. This may mean that we become over-confident and fail to 
recognise warning signs. As emergency planners, this may impede our ability to recognise 
warning signs of disaster, and also may inhibit us from looking at other learning 
opportunities. 
IX.Censorship and Learning from Success
Perrow (1999) argued that many investigations into accidents are ‘left censored’. 
This means that they examined only failures and not systems with the same 
characteristics that have not failed. This suggests that there is much to be learned from 
success as well as failure.
“If the aim of the Inquiry is to collect and analyse evidence as a means of encouraging 
learning then it might incorporate the study of success as well as failure.”
Elliott and McGuinness, 2002, P.200
X. Focusing solely on technical elements
If you allow yourself to focus solely on the technical elements of the inquiry report you may 
ignore the human aspects of causality which are central to both crisis incubation and 
learning.
XI. Establishing a blame free culture
A blame free culture is important in ensuring that learning can take place from near-miss 
events. However it does not imply that illegal or reckless actions should be ignored by the 
organisation.
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V) Comparison Study: Some themes from the July 7th Reports
Home Office (2006) Addressing Lessons from the Emergency Response to the 
7 July 2005 Bombings: What we learned and what we are doing about it
London Regional Resilience Forum (2006) Looking Back, Moving Forward
For overview of themes see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5370666.stm
It is useful to compare the inquiry findings after previous disasters, with the reviews 
into the terrorist attacks of July 7th 2005. As discussed earlier there has not been a 
public inquiry into these events, so these themes have emerged in the reviews 
conducted by the various organisations.
It is heartening to see that in planning for the response and in the recovery process 
many lessons have been learnt and implemented (even before the full introduction 
of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 in November 2005) but some issues remain. As 
you will see, a number of themes are very similar to the earlier disasters.
“Learning from Success” Emergency Response, Strength and Flexibility of 
Arrangements, Civil Contingencies Act 2004
Telecommunications generally worked well
Successful response thanks to four years of 
planning
and training.
Hospitals made ready.
Evacuation Procedure worked well.
London Mass Fatality Plan.
Family Liaison System.
Management of Cordons Police were too strict with cordons which
prevented engineers etc from getting on the site.
Communications (Strategic) Government contact was seen as slow 
and agencies did not work together to 
share information
Proposed that there are Senior 
Government Co-ordinators
Communications (Operational)
Linked to Command and Control
Difficulties with older telecommunications 
equipment degraded command and control 
capabilities
Problems with Mobile Phone Network 
Management
Problems with communications underground
There should be a dedicated digital 
communications 
network
Care of People Delays in Identification, Lack of Information
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Support for Survivors
Confusion over the Data Protection Act
Delays in Compensation
People were left feeling out of touch
Details of people were not collected
The name “Family Assistance Centre” deterred 
some 
people from attending
Police Casualty Bureau Overwhelmed
Medical First Aid Limited first aid suppliers and first aiders at 
stations
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VI) Techniques of learning lessons applicable to Emergency Planners
Bismark is alleged to have said “Only fools learn from their own experience. I prefer to 
learn from the experience of others.” (See Moore, 1992, P.99)
This light hearted take on the situation is highly pertinent to today’s emergency planners.
Learning Lessons from Disaster
A number of exercise debrief reports that I have reviewed in recent months have made 
reference to “lessons identified” rather than “lessons learnt”. This would seem to be an 
acknowledgement that to truly learn, it is not enough to list issues but instead an 
implementation strategy with appropriate auditing and follow-up must be put in place.
Working in both operational and academic environments I have gained insight into both 
fields. It has struck me that few (although the numbers are growing) emergency planners 
are familiar with the vast body of research examining the way that lessons are learned 
from disaster. This material has great relevance to today’s emergency planners and key 
reading in this area would include; 
Dr Barry Turner and Nick Pidgeon: Man Made Disasters
The work of the late Professor Barry Turner was highly influential in this area. 
Anybody wanting to learn more about lessons from disaster and “warning signs” is 
directed towards this work.
Turner and Pidgeon argued that humans and their organisational systems provide the 
background conditions for many disasters. Evidence for this can be found in numerous 
public inquiry reports. This challenges perceptions that disasters are unexpected, 
unpredictable “Acts of God.”
Incubation Period
Learning about and understanding the importance of the “incubation period” is very 
important for Emergency Planners. Many of the disasters discussed in this review were 
typified by this “incubation period” in which a number of events accumulated over time but 
went unnoticed or were misunderstood. Both social and technical factors are involved and 
interact with each other.
Turner proposed a six stage model for understanding the development of disasters:
1)Notionally Normal Starting Points:
Cultural beliefs about the world and its hazards, Precautionary norms are set out 
in laws, codes of practice etc
2)Incubation Period
The accumulation of an unnoticed set of events which are at odds with the 
accepted beliefs about hazards and ways in which they can be avoided
3) Precipitating Event
Brings attention to itself and transforms general perceptions of Stage 2.
4) Onset
The immediate consequences of the collapse of cultural precautions become 
apparent.
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5)Rescue and Salvage-First Stage Adjustment
The immediate post-collapse situation is recognised in ad hoc adjustments which 
permit the work of rescue and salvage to be started
6) Full cultural readjustment
An Inquiry or assessment is carried out and beliefs and precautionary norms are 
adjusted to fit the newly gained understanding of the world
Through the public inquiry process a cultural readjustment will occur that allows new 
norms and operating practices to develop that will replace procedures that existed before 
the disaster (As also explored in Elliott and McGuiness, 2002)
Turner and Pidgeon go on to look at the practical applications of this work and the way in 
which organisations can turn knowledge of this six stage process into applicable safety 
lessons.
Professor Brian Toft and Simon Reynolds
This work on learning after disaster is pivotal to understanding how we learn lessons from 
a public inquiry. 
Active Foresight
The goal for emergency planners is to generate “active foresight”; this means that material 
from past disaster presents us with an ability to change, adapt and improve on our 
practices. Ultimately risk reduction procedures are implemented based on the knowledge 
gained.
Isomorphic Learning
Toft and Reynolds explore in detail ways in which we learn lessons after disaster and in 
particular the concept of “Isomorphic Learning”.  
This means that lessons learned can be extrapolated and applied to similar organisations.
Isomorphic Potential::
Event Isomorphism-Two separate disasters that manifest themselves in different ways
but lead to the creation of identical hazardous situations. Because the events leading 
up to the disaster are different, we may miss the potential for learning.
Cross Organisational-Very different organisations but the same industry e.g. British 
Airways and American Airlines. Both organisations may suffer from similar errors.
Common Mode-Different industries but similar tools, techniques, procedures 
used in the process.
Self-organisational-The organisation is so large it has many operational sub-units e.g. local 
government or the NHS.
For a full explanation of this see Toft and Reynolds, 2005, P.72
Are Public Inquiries Appropriate for Learning?
In their book “Learning from Disasters: A Management Approach” Toft and Reynolds pose 
the question: Are public inquiries Appropriate?
“At every large-scale accident inquiry the hope is expressed that the investigation will 
ensure ‘this shall not happen again.’ In practice adequate learning is often constrained”
(Toft and Reynolds,2005, P.126)
This review has explored a number of reasons why this might be the case.
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Dominic Elliott and Martina McGuiness
Elliott and McGuiness provided further insight into the barriers we must overcome before 
we can learn from disasters. These include:
What is meant by the term “learning”?
Learning is not simply the absorption of facts but should also involve “a fundamental shift 
or movement of mind” that goes on to change behaviour. (Senge, 1990 in Elliott and 
McGuiness, 2002, P.14)
Also how is this lesson transferred?
Knowledge acquisition is only part of the learning process
Arguably cultural readjustment does not necessarily occur and even when the public 
inquiry captures relevant knowledge, learning in the form of changed behaviour does not 
necessarily follow.
Tacit and explicit knowledge
Tacit knowledge is the type acquired during a long apprenticeship with a master craftsman 
which may be difficult to put into words. Explicit knowledge is more formal and easily 
communicated.
Organisational Conditions
These will influence the receptiveness to knowledge and changes to operating norms and 
practices.
Such discussions may seem a little “impenetrable” but as a supervisor of numerous 
dissertations undertaken by practitioners engaging in part time study, I have had the 
privilege of observing how these principles can be applied extremely effectively to one’s 
own organisation. 
Techniques to assist with learning
The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and accompanying guidance has heightened emergency 
planner’s awareness of the need for best practice guidance, information sharing, co-
operation etc. It will be very interesting to see in the coming years the effect that this has 
on our ability to learn lessons after disaster. Already we see documents available on 
www.ukresilience.info outlining the lessons from disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, 
USA, August 2005 that can be extrapolated for UK emergency planners.
A number of academics have also proposed techniques to assist with learning lessons 
after disaster and these may provide additional avenues for emergency planners to 
explore. Examples would include:
Schematic Report Analysis Diagrams
(See examples in Toft and Reynolds, 2005)
Toft and Reynolds developed the Schematic Report Analysis Diagram as a method of 
analysing inquiry reports. The aim was that this would be a step towards resolving the 
problem of omitting key events in the chain leading up to disaster.
This technique can be computerised, can be used in disaster analysis and reporting, can 
be used by the Inquiry and any other forum, and can be used as a teaching aid.
Public Inquiries: Thematic Review
Emergency Planning College
Lucy Easthope 2007
38
Creating “Turbulence”
This is an idea proposed by Smith and Elliott. How do organisations consider all these 
complex interactions? One solution is for organisations to ‘generate turbulence’ by 
constantly challenging their core beliefs, assumptions and shared values. Such turbulence 
allows for the provision of “double loop” learning in which the standards used by the 
organisation and the frameworks for decision making are constantly reassessed. It is no 
longer adequate to look at decision outcomes, instead organisations need to examine the 
manner in which that decision is made and the impact of their own values and 
assumptions in framing that process (Elliott and Smith, 2007, P.18.)
Learning from Near Misses
A number of writers in this field have examined the ways in which lessons can be learned 
from near misses rather than full blown disasters, including Bennett and Toft and 
Reynolds. For this to happen, these lessons need to be recorded, analysed and acted 
upon (Bennett, 2000.)
This is often much more complex that it may initially sound; it can be hard to recognise a 
near miss and differentiate it from simply a “bad day at the office.” Practitioners may also 
be wary of blame being attributed to them and their colleagues. This is a ripe area for 
further research in the emergency planning sphere.
Industries such as aviation do have good practice methods that may be applicable e.g. 
through the use of the “CHIRP” confidential reporting system which allows aviation 
personnel to post anonymised concerns and “near misses” that are then published for 
others to learn from. A number of transport operators also have similar schemes.
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VII) Conclusions
The legal process after disaster is complex, fascinating and of vital importance to 
today’s emergency planners. That is reason enough to ensure a thorough 
understanding of public inquiries.
However many demands are placed on planners and work is ongoing to establish 
the competencies they will need to demonstrate. Time and resources are limited, 
and it can seem overly ambitious to expect busy practitioners to also try and review 
a vast swathe of material available to them. In addition, political climates and social 
complexities can make initiating change management a near-impossible task.
To assist with this, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat already produce reflective 
documents incorporating lessons identified from previous events and the 
Emergency Planning Society often features presentations (e.g. at their annual 
conference) which can help practitioners to understand more about the similarities 
between far away incidents and their own home town. This is also an important 
teaching and training method nationally. As many practitioners also undertake part 
time academic study, they become more and more familiar with the rich vein of 
research in this area. This is something that must continue to be supported.
The acknowledgement that identifying lessons is only the first step is also a crucial 
one and methodologies for ensuring that they are put into practice should also be 
explored. Polices and frameworks should not re-invent the wheel but should take 
appropriate heed of the lessons from the past; in the initial summary wider reaching 
implications of some of the barriers to learning were highlighted and policy makers 
should aim to “create turbulence” in their own work, challenging the assumptions 
that may have crept in.
As asserted at the outset, public inquiries have been identified as “the most 
valuable source of information to help prevent recurrence of disasters” (Toft and 
Reynolds, 1999, P.45.) This would perhaps suggest that there is an additional 
obligation to fully understand both the recurrent themes highlighted by inquiries and 
any impediments to implementing these in ones organisation: we should not need 
to be forced into activating changes or improvements only when tragedies occur. 
Instead we should fully embrace every last detail from the data we already have to 
ensure that every lesson is not only learnt but also implemented.
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Appendix
List of Public Inquiries after Disaster reviewed in detail
Year of 
Disaster
Details of Disaster Details of Inquiry
1985 Bradford City Fire
11th May 1985
56 people died
Also Birmingham Wall Collapse where 1 
person died (also on 11th May 1985) 
and Heysel disaster where 38 people died
(29th May 1985)
Mr Justice Popplewell (1986)
Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into Crowd Safety and Control at Sports 
Grounds
Cmnd. 9710 
1987 Herald of Free Enterprise
Ferry Capsize caused by water rushing 
into open bow doors
6th March 1987
192 people died
Mr Justice Sheen (1987)
M.V.Herald of Free Enterprise, Report 
of the Court, No 8074 Department of 
Transport
1987 King’s Cross Fire
A fire in the London Underground
18th November 1987
31 people died
Desmond Fennel QC (1988)
Investigation into the King’s Cross 
Underground Fire
CM 499 HMSO
1988 Piper Alpha
Oil platform explosion and fire
8th July 1988
167 people died
The Hon Lord Cullen (1990)
The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha 
Disaster 
Established under the Offshore 
Installations (Public Inquiries) 
Regulations
1990 CMND 1310 HMSO
1988 Clapham
Collision between two trains
12th December 1988
35 people died
Anthony Hidden QC(1989) Investigation 
into the Clapham Junction Railway 
Accident
CM 820 HMSO
1989 Hillsborough Football Stadium
Crush within the stands
15th April 1989
96 people died 
Right Hon Lord Justice Taylor (1990)
The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 
Interim Report, CM 765 HMSO
1989 Marchioness
Sinking of a pleasure boat after it collided 
with a dredger
20th August 1989
51 people died
(Inquiry was not announced until 2000)
Marine Accident Investigation Branch: 
1991
Lord Justice Clarke 
(between 1999-2001)
Thames Safety Inquiry
Final Report Cm 4558 TSO
Marchioness/Bowbelle
Formal Investigation under the 
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Merchant Shipping Act, 2001
Collision and the Search and Rescue 
Operation
Public Inquiry into the Identification of 
Victims following Major Transport 
Accidents. Cm 5012 TSO
1996 Dunblane
School Shooting
13th March 1996
18 people died 
The Hon Lord Cullen (1996)
The Public Inquiry into the Shootings at 
Dunblane Primary School on 13 March 
1996
CM 3386, The Scottish Office
1997 Southall
Rail Collision
19th September 1997
7 people died
Professor John Uff QC (2000)
The Southall Rail Accident Inquiry 
Report
Health and Safety Commission
Also see Ladbroke Grove below
1999
Ladbroke Grove (also known as 
Paddington)
Rail Collision
5th October 1999
31 people died
The Hon Lord Cullen and Professor 
John Uff QC
1) Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry
2) The Joint Inquiry into Train Protection
Systems (2001)
Part 1 was concerned with issues relating to 
the Ladbroke Grove train crash and part 2 
was related to wider issues of safety 
management and the regulatory regime.
Other disasters referred to in the discussion
2002 Potters Barr
Train derailment
10th May 2002
7 people died
Investigations by British Transport 
Police, Health and Safety Executive, 
Rail Standards and Safety Board
Requests for a public inquiry were 
rejected-see www.bbc.co.uk
Similarities with Grayrigg points 
failure
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami
26th December 2004
Death toll of over 300,000 world wide
150 Britons confirmed dead with others still
missing 
No inquiry but review by National
Audit Office and Zito Trust - see
Bibliography
2005 Suicide Bombings at four locations around A number of reports including:
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London (three underground trains and one 
above
ground bus)
7th July 2005
56 people died
(including 4 bombers)
Report of the July 7th Review
Committee, 2006
The Home Office report on lessons from
the emergency response,2006
London Resilience Report 
“Looking Back. Moving Forward”, 2006
For full details see Bibliography and also
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5370666.stm
2005 Hurricane Katrina
United States of America
See reports available on 
www.ukresilience.info and 
www.bbc.co.uk
2007 Grayrigg
23rd February 2007
Train Derailment
1 person died
Rail Accident Investigation Branch 
have produced a report
available at www.raib.gov.uk
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Useful Websites
(as at Monday 21st May 2007)
www.bristol-inquiry.org.uk
The Inquiry into the management of the care of children receiving complex cardiac surgical 
services at Bristol Royal Infirmary
www.bseinquiry.gov.uk
The Inquiry into BSE and variant CJD in the United Kingdom, chaired by Lord Philips 
www.corporateaccountability.org
Centre for Corporate Accountability
www.dca.gov.uk
Department of Constitutional Affairs
www.disasteraction.org.uk
Disaster Action is an organisation that represents survivors and the bereaved of disasters 
in the UK
www.interpol.int
International Protocols for Disaster Victim Identification are available on a section of this 
site
http://www.marchioness-bowbelle.org.uk/report.htm
Marchioness Inquiry Link
www.nao.gov.uk
National Audit Office
www.opsi.gov.uk and www.publications.parliament.uk
Legislation and Parliamentary Publications
www.rail.reg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.1204.
Ladbroke Grove Inquiry Link
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www.ukresilience.info
Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Cabinet Office
Glossary
CCA
Civil Contingencies Act 2004
HSE
Health and Safety Executive
QC
Queen’s Counsel
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